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Do Your Clients' Confidences Go Out the
Window When Your Employees Go Out the
Door?
by
KELLY A. RANDALL*
Lawyers traditionally have employed lay personnel, such as sec-
retaries, paralegals, and law clerks, to assist them with their work. As
the employment of lay personnel has increased as a means of reducing
the cost of providing legal services, ethical questions have arisen re-
garding their role in the lawyer's representation of clients. Because lay
personnel are not governed by the same ethical rules that govern at-
torneys,' a client currently has no assurance that a member of her
attorney's support staff will not go to work for her adversary or her
adversary's counsel.
Although the expanded use of lay personnel has been praised as
a means of delivering legal services more efficiently, 2 it increases the
nonlawyers' exposure to confidential and privileged information. One
commentator notes, "Given the time and volume pressures on a prac-
ticing attorney, it is submitted that there is almost nothing, short of
actual court appearances, that a lawyer will not delegate to a com-
petent paralegal. . . ."I Some examples of what assistants may do
under a lawyer's supervision include: Perform legal research; draft
legal documents such as pleadings, briefs, subpoenas, and affidavits;
attend client conferences; analyze and index documents; answer docket
calls when no argument is necessary; interview prospective witnesses;
prepare financial records; assist in trial preparation; and sign letters.4
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A. 1988, University of Colorado, Boulder. The Author
would like to thank Mitch Randall, David Bell, Donald Putterman and Larry Lowe for
reviewing earlier drafts of this Note.
1. MODEL CODE OF PRoFEssIONAL REsPoNSIILTY Preliminary Statement (1981) [herein-
after Preliminary Statement].
2. Connecticut Bar Ass'n, Lawyers' Professional Responsibility Obligations Concerning
Paralegals, 59 CoN. B.J. 425, 432 (1985).
3. W. STATxKY, THE REaULATION OF PARAEOALS 79-80 (1981) (citing W. STATSKY & P.
LANo, THE LEGAL PARAPROFESSIONAL AS ADVOCATE AND ASSISTANT: RoLEs, TRAING CONCEPTS,
AND MATERLALS 47-48 (1971)).
4. KaErrucKy PARALEoAL CODE Rule 3.700, Preliminary Statement, reprinted in W.
STATSKY, supra note 3, at 71; Colorado Bar Ass'n, Guidelines for the Utilization of Legal
Assistants, 18 Tan COao.ADO LAwYER 2097 (1989); Connecticut Bar Ass'n, supra note 2, at
436; Ulrich & Clarke, Working with Legal Assistants: Professional Responsibility, 67 A.B.A.
J. 992 (1981).
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When clients seek the assistance of an attorney, they enter into
a confidential relationship, in which they are entitled to know that the
attorney will vigorously represent them and protect their interests.
Generally, there are three sources of protection for clients in this area.
First, the attorney-client privilege gives the client an absolute right to
prevent the disclosure of communications made to or by the attorney.,
Attorneys also have an independent obligation to protect their clients'
"confidences" and "secrets." 6 Second, the conflict of interest rules
provide that attorneys will not take a position adverse to the client's
interests.7 Thus, conflict of interest rules ensure: that neither party has
an unfair advantage in litigation; that a lawyer does not violate her
duty of loyalty; that a lawyer will not use confidential information
to the disadvantage of a client; and that the integrity of the judicial
system is not harmed. 8 Third, the attorney work product privilege helps
assure that the attorney is able to represent the client vigorously, and
that an adversary is not able to take advantage of the attorney's theories
and strategies. 9
5. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-161 (1986); CAL. EVID. CODE § 954 (West 1966 & Supp.
1991); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(I)(b) (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-21 (Harrison 1990);
HAw. REV. STAT. § 626, Rule 503 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-
1-14-5 (Burns 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-426 (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.210(4)
(Baldwin 1991); MD. CTS. & JUD. PRoC. CODE ANN. § 9-108 (1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-
1-803 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-1921 (1989); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49.095 (Michie
1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-6(B) (1990); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4503 (Consol. 1963
& Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 501 & commentary (1990); OHIo Rv. CODE
ANN. § 2317.02(A) (Anderson 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2502 (West 1980); OR. REV.
STAT. § 40.225 (1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-2 (1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-5-105
(1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (1977); W. VA. CODE § 50-5-5 & note (1986); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 905.03 (1975); Wyo. STAT. § 1-12-101(a)(i) (1990).
6. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1989); MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
sIoNAL RESPONSmiTy DR 4-101 (1981).
7. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7-1.12 (1989); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONsImrLiry DR 5-105(A) (1981).
8. See, e.g., Gabianelli v. Azar, 777 P.2d 1167, 1169 (Alaska 1989) (unfair advantage);
Gregori v. Bank of Am., 207 Cal. App. 3d 291, 300, 254 Cal. Rptr. 853, 858-59 (1989) (unfair
advantage and judicial integrity); In re Infotechnology, Inc., 582 A.2d 215, 221 (Del. 1990)
(judicial integrity); Ford v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 436 So. 2d 305, 307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (confidential information used to disadvantage former client); Greene v. Greene, 47
N.Y.2d 447, 451, 391 N.E.2d 1355, 1357, 418 N.Y.S.2d 379, 381 (1979) (duty of loyalty);
King v. King, No. 89-46-11 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (LEXIS, States library, Tenn. file No. 675)
(Koch, J., concurring) (unfair advantage).
9. See, e.g., ALA. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(3); ALASKA Civ. R. 26(b)(3); ARIZ. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(3); ARK. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 2018 (West Supp. 1991); DEL.
CH. CT. R. 26(b)(3); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(3); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11OA, I 201(b)(2)
(Smith-Hurd 1985); IowA R. Crv. P. 122(c); KY. R. Cirv. P. 26.02(3)(a); LA. CODE Crv. PROC.
ANN. art. 1424 (West 1984); MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.02(3); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-I-226(b)(3)
(Supp. 1990); NEV. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); N.Y. Cirv. PRAC. L. & R. § 3101(d) (Consol. 1970);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-I, Rule 26(b)(3) (1990); N.D. R. Cirv. P. 26(b)(3); OHIo Crv. R.
26(b)(3); OR. R. Civ. P. 26(B)(3); UTAH R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); VT. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
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Although there are provisions in both the Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
dealing with the responsibilities of a lawyer in supervising her support
staff,'0 neither effectively places responsibility on the hiring attorney
to ensure that conflicts of interest do not exist when she hires an as-
sistant. In addition, very few states have confronted the issue of non-
lawyer side-switching. 1 The protection of the clients' secrets and
confidences, as well as attorneys' work product, demands legislation
that effectively regulates support staff's ability to switch sides during
litigation.
This Note focuses on the importance of such legislation for cli-
ents, attorneys, and nonlawyers. Part I discusses attorneys' ethical
responsibilities in their relationships with clients and staff. Part II re-
views the conflict of interest rules currently governing attorneys. Part
III summarizes the different approaches taken by states regarding sup-
port staff conflicts of interest and analyzes their effectiveness. Finally,
Part IV proposes a new rule that would require lawyers to protect
clients from support staff conflicts of interest.
I. Legal Ethics-Whose Responsibility Is It?
The American Bar Association (ABA) has promulgated two sets
of model regulations concerning legal ethics: the Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility (Model Code) and the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct (Model Rules). The Model Code was passed first,
but in 1983, the ABA replaced the Model Code with the ModelRules.12
As of 1989, thirty-three states had amended their professional re-
10. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPoNsmLTY DR 4-101(D) (1981); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.3 (1989); see also infra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
11. The term "side-switching" generally refers to instances where a lawyer represents
interests adverse to a former client. Courts in the following states have addressed the issue of
nonlawyer conflicts of interest, although not necessarily side-switching: Arkansas (Herron v.
Jones, 276 Ark. 493, 637 S.W.2d 569 (1982)); California (Widger v. Owens Fiberglas Corp.
(In re Complex Asbestos Litigation), No. A04721, slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 19, 1991);
Gregori v. Bank of Am., 207 Cal. App. 3d 291, 254 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1989)); Florida (Esquire
Care, Inc. v. Maguire, 532 So. 2d 740 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Lackow v. Walter E. Heller
& Co., 466 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)); Illinois (Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C & 0
Enter., Inc. 637 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Ill. 1985)); Missouri (Williams v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 588 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. Mo. 1984)); New York (Glover Bottled Gas Corp. v. Circle
M. Beverage Barn, Inc., 129 A.D.2d 678, 514 N.Y.S.2d 440 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)); and
Tennessee (King v. King, No. 89-46-11 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (LEXIS, States Library, Tenn.
file No. 675)). See generally infra Part III.
12. Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 01:3, 01:4 (1990) [hereinafter Lawyers'
Manual].
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sponsibility rules to correspond with the Model Rules, and five states
were using a combination of the two structures. 3
These regulations serve two main purposes: they are a guide to
lawyers in their professional capacities, and they provide a basis for
discipline by state bar associations. 4 The Model Code has three com-
ponents: Canons-nine broad principles of lawyers' ethical obliga-
tions; Ethical Considerations (ECs)-aspirational guidelines to which
lawyers should conform their conduct; and Disciplinary Rules (DRs)-
mandatory rules governing lawyers' professional conduct. 5 The Model
Rules are comprised of rules and comments. Some of the rules are
mandatory obligations, a breach of which will result in discipline; others
are permissive and generally define a lawyer's role in the legal system. 6
The comments to each rule explain its meaning and provide guidance
to attorneys, but "do not add obligations to the Rules.' ' 7
These model regulations apply only to members of the bar, and
although they cannot regulate nonlawyers' conduct directly, they can
make attorneys responsible for their employees' conduct.' Unfortu-
nately, neither ethical nor disciplinary regulations control whether one
law firm may hire an employee of another law firm that represents
opposing parties. There are provisions in both the Model Code and
the Model Rules, however, that specifically relate to an attorney's re-
sponsibilities when working with nonlawyers. For example, an attor-
ney cannot assist a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law, 19
share legal fees with a nonlawyer, 20 or form a law partnership with
a nonlawyer. 21
13. Id.
14. See Preliminary Statement, supra note 1.
15. Id.
16. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Scope, para. 1 (1989).
17. Id.
18. See Preliminary Statement, supra note 1.
19. MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.5(b) (1989); MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSmELrrY DR 3-101(A) (1981); see also Florida Bar v. Bowles, 480 So. 2d 636,
636-7 (Fla. 1985) (allowing nonlawyer employee to counsel clients constituted aiding the
unauthorized practice of law); In re Schelly, 94 Ill. 2d 234, 240, 446 N.E.2d 236, 239 (1983)
(disbarred lawyer working as law clerk constituted unauthorized practice of law); In re Abbott,
167 A.D.2d 617, 621, 563 N.Y.S.2d 848, 850-51 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (lawyer suspended for
aiding nonlawyer in unauthorized practice of law); see generally Hunter & Klonoff, A Dialogue
on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 25 VmiL. L. REv. 6 (1979-1980).
20. MODEL RtLS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(a) (1989); MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL REsPONsmrrY DR 3-102(A) (1981); see also O'Hara v. Ahlgren, Blumenfeld &
Kempster, 127 Ill. 2d 333, 537 N.E.2d 730 (1989) (contract between law firm and lay person
for percentage of firm's income void as against public policy); Dupree v. Malpractice Research,
Inc., 179 Mich. App. 254, 445 N.W.2d 498 (1989) (contract to share contingency fee with
expert witness void as against public policy).
21. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(b) (1989); MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL REsFONsimrrY DR 3-103(A) (1981); see also Infante v. Gottesman, 233 N.J. Super.
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This does not mean, of course, that attorneys are prohibited from
delegating work to nonlawyers. The Model Code expressly encourages
the use of lay personnel, but cautions that lawyers must be responsible
for the nonlawyers' work.2 Ethical Consideration 3-6 states:
A lawyer often delegates tasks to clerks, secretaries, and other
lay persons. Such delegation is proper if the lawyer maintains a direct
relationship with his client, supervises the delegated work, and has
complete professional responsibility for the work product. This del-
egation enables a lawyer to render legal services more economically
and efficiently.?
Ultimately, then, attorneys are subject to some regulation in their pro-
fessional relationships with employees. The two main fields of reg-
ulation that would be addressed in a conflict of interest analysis are
the duty to preserve client confidences and the duty to supervise and
assume responsibility for nonlawyers' work. The following sections
review each of these subjects and discuss why they are ineffective at
protecting clients from support staff conflicts of interest.
A. Duty to Preserve Client Confidences
Lawyers are responsibile for ensuring that confidential client in-
formation remains confidential.2 This obligation extends to all in-
formation about a client learned as a result of the representation and
thus is even broader than the attorney-client privilege, which only pro-
tects communications between a lawyer and client. The attorney also
has an independent obligation to supervise employees to ensure that
a client's confidences are not exposed.2 Ethical Consideration 4-2 notes:
310, 315, 558 A.2d 1338, 1341 (1989) (alleged partnership agreement between claims investigator
and attorney invalid).
22. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITy EC 3-6 (1981).
23. Id.
24. Canon 4 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility provides: "A Lawyer
Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client." The term "confidences" covers
"information protected by the attorney-client privilege," and the term "secrets" includes
"other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held
inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental
to the client." MODEL CODE OF PROFmssIONAL REsPONsmixnT DR 4-101(A) (1981).
The Model Rules are broader and protect more information than the Model Code. MODEL
RuLas OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1989) prohibits a lawyer from revealing any
"information relating to representation of a client." Although this phrase is not defined, the
ABA has stated that it covers all information gained during the course of the representation,
whether or not disclosure would be embarrassing or detrimental to the client's interests. ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1526, at 2 n.1 (1988).
25. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmiLTY EC 4-4 (1981).
26. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIimTY DR 4-101()) (1981). This Rule provides,
in pertinent part: "A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his employees, associates,
and others whose services are utilized by him from disclosing or using confidences or secrets
of a client . . . ." Id.
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It is a matter of common knowledge that the normal operation of
a law office exposes confidential professional information to non-
lawyer employees of the office, particularly secretaries and those hav-
ing access to the files; and this obligates a lawyer to exercise care
in selecting and training his employees so that the sanctity of all con-
fidences and secrets of his clients may be preserved.
27
Although the duty to preserve client confidences provides some
protection for clients, it does not deal effectively with the issue of
nonlawyer side-switching. The major defect is that once the assistant
leaves the lawyer's employ, the lawyer can no longer effectively reg-
ulate the employee's ethical conduct. Additionally, the hiring firm is
not obligated to ensure that confidential information acquired by the
employee at her previous firm is not revealed.
B. Duty to Supervise and Assume Responsibility for Nonlawyers' Work
Model Rule 5.3 defines a lawyer's responsibilities in supervising
lay personnel. It requires that partners and supervising lawyers in a
law firm make reasonable efforts to ensure that their employees' con-
duct complies with their own professional responsibilities. 28 The rule
also makes lawyers responsible for an employee's misconduct if she
ordered or ratified the misconduct, or if she is a partner or supervising
lawyer and failed to take corrective action after the misconduct was
discovered. 29 More importantly, even if a lawyer is unaware of the
27. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-2 (1981).
28. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 5.3(a)-(b) (1989). These rules provide:
With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer:
(a) a partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm
has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct is
compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;
(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make
reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with the
professional obligations of the lawyer; ...
Id.
29. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.3(c) (1989). This rule provides:
[A] lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a
violation of the rules of professional conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:
(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the
conduct involved; or
(2) the lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the person is employed, or
has direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows of the conduct at a
time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable
remedial action.
Id.; see also Connecticut Bar Ass'n, supra note 2, at 432 ("Lawyers have assumed professional
ethics responsibility for the conduct of paralegals if the lawyers order the conduct, ratify it,
or as partners or supervisors know of the conduct in time to prevent any adverse conse-
quences."); In re Craven, 267 S.C. 33, 225 S.E.2d 861 (1976) (attorney's knowledge that
employee was engaged in solicitation resulted in discipline).
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misconduct, she still may be disciplined if her lack of knowledge is
based on her failure to supervise.30 For example, if a nonlawyer em-
ployee solicits legal business without her employer's knowledge, the
lawyer-employer nevertheless may be disciplined if reasonable super-
vision would have disclosed the misconduct.31
Courts also often hold attorneys responsible for failing to su-
pervise employees who engage in illegal or negligent conduct. 32 For
example, in Florida Bar v. Mitchell,33 the court applied Florida's new
Rule of Professional Conduct 4-5.334 and held an attorney responsible
for fraud committed by his secretary. Mitchell's secretary had forged
the signature of an assistant state attorney on several clients' plea
agreements. In upholding Mitchell's suspension for fifteen days, the
court noted:
The misconduct in this case, although caused by a nonlawyer
employee of Mitchell, involves both fraud upon the court and ne-
glecting the best interest of clients. We regard this as highly serious.
Had these acts been committed by Mitchell himself, they would have
warranted much more severe discipline. Based on this record, we
must conclude at a minimum that Mitchell is guilty of negligently
30. See In re Galbasini, 163 Ariz. 120, 124, 786 P.2d 971, 975 (1990) (lawyer suspended
for six months when two independent contractors solicited legal business on behalf of the
lawyer); cf. In re Corace, 390 Mich. 419, 424-25, 213 N.W.2d 124, 127 (1973) (lawyer not
vicariously liable for employee's misconduct absent finding that he was aware or should have
been aware of the impropriety and did nothing to guard against it); see also Lawyers' Manual,
supra note 12, at 91:203 (1987). In some cases, a lawyer also may incur vicarious civil liability
for the misconduct of an employee if the employee's acts are within the scope of employment.
See, e.g., DeVaux v. American Home Assurance Co., 387 Mass. 814, 820, 444 N.E.2d 355,
358-59 (1983) (attorney who places employees in position that may deceive clients into believing
an attorney-client relationship has been formed may be liable for malpractice based on the
negligence of those employees); Bockian v. Esanu Katsky Korins & Siger, 124 Misc. 2d 607,
610-11, 476 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1012-13 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (attorney cannot be held vicariously liable
for conduct of process server, since process server was not an agent or employee of the
attorney).
31. See, e.g., Galbasini, 163 Ariz. at 124, 786 P.2d at 975.
32. See, e.g., In re Scanlan, 144 Ariz. 334, 337, 697 P.2d 1084, 1087 (1985) (lawyer
suspended for negligently supervising employee who embezzled funds from trust accounts);
Florida Bar v. Mitchell, 569 So. 2d 424, 424 (Fla. 1990) (attorney suspended for falling to
supervise secretary who had forged opposing attorney's name on plea agreements); In re
Berkos, 93 Ill. 2d 408, 413, 444 N.E.2d 150, 152 (1982) (lawyer suspended for falling to
supervise secretary who engaged in malfeasance); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Goldberg,
292 Md. 650, 656, 441 A.2d 338, 341 (1982) (lawyer suspended for failing to take "the simple
precaution of running his eye over bank statements at the end of the month"); Oklahoma Bar
Ass'n v. Braswell, 663 P.2d 1228, 1232 (Okla. 1983) (lawyer suspended for failing to supervise
law clerk who let statute of limitations run); In re Rude, 88 S.D. 416, 423, 221 N.W.2d 43,
48 (1974) (lawyer could not escape responsibility for mishandling clients' funds by blaming
employees).
33. 569 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 1990).
34. FA. STAT. ANN. Bar Rule 4-5.3(b)-(c) (West Supp. 1991).
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supervising the activities of his workers, which constitutes an ethical
breach.35
Thus, even though Mitchell's conduct was not negligent or illegal, he
was disciplined for allowing his employee to engage in illegal conduct.
The problem with Model Rule 5.3 is that it fails to take into ac-
count situations that arise after a nonlawyer has left the firm. A lawyer
cannot have a duty to supervise a former employee. As a result, it is
inadequate to protect a client's confidences where a nonlawyer switches
sides.
Both the Model Code and the Model Rules make it clear that
lawyers are responsible for legal ethics. Lawyers, not lay personnel,
have a duty to preserve client confidences and a duty to ensure com-
pliance with professional ethics. Although there is a growing move-
ment to create a regulated class of "paraprofessionals" capable of
providing many of the same services lawyers perform, 36 state bar as-
sociations currently have no control over the conduct of nonlawyers. 37
Thus, lawyers must be responsible for clients' interests, and although
the above regulations afford clients some protection, they are inad-
equate for dealing with an employee's conflict of interest. In this era
of increased employment of nonlawyers, it is time for states to adopt
a support staff conflict of interest rule, similar to that governing at-
torneys, which will afford clients more specific protection of their in-
terests.
II. Attorney Conflict of Interest
Generally, an attorney is prohibited from representing a client
whose interests are adverse to, or in conflict with, either an existing3
35. Mitchell, 569 So. 2d at 424.
36. See Albert, Paralegal Regulation: Who Will Control the Future of the Profession?,
LEGAL ASSISTANT TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 36-37; Hall, New Rules for Legal Techs Urged,
L.A. Daily Journal, May 18, 1990, at 10, col. 1; Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly:
A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STA. L.
REv. 1 (1981); Note, Deregulation of the Practice of Law: Panacea or Placebo?, 42 HASTINGS
L.J. 203 (1990) (authored by Meredith A. Munro).
37. See Preliminary Statement, supra note 1.
38. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1989); MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(A) (1980). Model Rule 1.7 provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be
directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the
relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42
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or a former client,3 9 without the clients' informed consent. When such
an ethical violation occurs, courts are faced with numerous questions:
Should the court sanction or discipline the attorney, or disqualify her
from the new representation? How does the court determine whether
an ethical violation actually occurred or a client's interests actually
were harmed? What happens to the attorney's associates when an at-
torney is disqualified? Although courts do not provide uniform an-
swers to these questions, some general rules do exist. The following
sections review the conflict of interest rules and examine how they are
applied.
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third
person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected;
and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple clients in
a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the
implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks involved.
MODEL RUL.Es OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 1.7 (1989). The Model Code requires a lawyer
to decline proffered employment if the lawyer's "independent professional judgment in behalf
of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected" by acceptance of the employment, or
if the acceptance of the employment will require her to represent "differing interests." MODEL
CODE OF PROFEssIONAL RESPONSIBmIITY DR 5-105(A) (1980).
39. MODEL Rt.Ls OF PRoFEssimNAL CoNDucT Rule 1.9 (1989). The Rule provides:
(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter
represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that
person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless
the former client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially
related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had
previously represented a client
(1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and
(2) about whom the lawyer* had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6
[confidentiality] and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter;
unless the former client consents after consultation.
(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or
former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:
(1) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former
client except as Rule 1.6 [confidentiality of information] or Rule 3.3 [candor toward
the tribunal] would permit or require with respect to a client, or when the information
has become generally known; or
(2) reveal information relating to the representation except as Rule 1.6 or 3.3 would
permit or require with respect to a client.
Id.
The Model Code does not expressly prohibit a lawyer from representing interests adverse to
a former client. However, it does include three provisions that implicitly prohibit such conduct:
(1) the requirement that a lawyer preserve the confidences and secrets of a client under DR 4-
101 (see supra note 24); (2) the conflict-of-interest rules of DR 5-105 (see supra note 38); and
(3) the general rule that a lawyer should avoid even the appearance of impropriety in Canon
9 (see infra note 91). Lawyer's Manual, supra note 12, § 51:2002 (1987).
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A. Disqualification
A trial court may disqualify an attorney on the basis of the court's
obligation to control the conduct of its ministerial officers.4 Never-
theless, courts generally conclude that ethical violations should be ad-
dressed by the disciplinary committee of the state bar, unless the
violation has tainted a trial's fairness or threatened the integrity of
the judicial process. 41 If an attorney's conduct does "taint" the liti-
gation, the opposing party may make a motion, or the court may de-
termine, sua sponte, to disqualify the attorney. 42
Because disqualification motions often are used as a purely tac-
tical tool,43 courts must balance competing policy considerations when
assessing such motions. The public's interest in the integrity of the
40. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128(a)(5) (West Supp. 1991) ("Every court shall
have the power to . . . control in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers,
and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in
every matter pertaining thereto."); Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 701 F.2d
85, 87 (9th Cir. 1983) ("court has the responsibility for controlling the conduct of attorneys
practicing before it"); Nemours Found. v. Gilbane, 632 F. Supp. 418, 421 (D. Del. 1986)
(court has power "to supervise the ethical activities of the attorneys who practice before it
and, if necessary, disqualify those whose conduct breaches the norms as established by the
bar").
41. See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 445-46 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated
on other grounds and remanded, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d
1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979); Williams v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 1037, 1046
n.4 (W.D. Mo. 1984); King v. King, No. 89-46-11 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (LEXIS, States
library, Tenn. file No. 675 at *30) (Koch, J., concurring).
42. See, e.g., In re W.F. Dev. Corp., 905 F.2d 883, 885 (5th Cir. 1990) (court's sua
sponte disqualification of attorney did not deny attorney due process); Government of India
v. Cook Indus., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1057, 1059-60 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (court may examine
conflict of interest and disqualify attorney on its own motion), aff'd, 569 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.
1978); Empire Linotype School, Inc. v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 627, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)
(court may disqualify attorney on its own motion); Gregori v. Bank of Am., 207 Cal. App.
3d 291, 295, 254 Cal. Rptr. 853, 855 (1989) (motion to disqualify brought by opposing party).
As the Gregori court stated:
[D]isqualification is proper where, as a result of a prior representation or through
improper means, there is a reasonable probability counsel has obtained information
the court believes would likely be used advantageously against an adverse party
during the course of the litigation. Though such information cannot be unlearned,
and the lawyer who obtained it cannot be prevented from giving it to others,
disqualification still serves the useful purpose of eliminating from the case the
attorney who could most effectively exploit the unfair advantage.
Id. at 309, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 865 (citing Chronometrics, Inc. v. Sysgen, Inc., 110 Cal. App.
3d 597, 607-08, 168 Cal. Rptr. 196, 202-03 (1980)).
43. See, e.g., Manning v. Waring, 849 F.2d 222, 224-25 (6th Cir. 1988); Armstrong, 625
F.2d at 437; Lemaire v. Texaco, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1308, 1309 (E.D. Tex. 1980); Cottonwood
Estates v. Paradise Builders, 128 Ariz. 99, 104-05, 624 P.2d 296, 301-02 (1981) (en banc);
Gregori, 207 Cal. App. 3d at 301, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 859; In re Infotechnology, Inc., 582 A.2d
215, 221 (Del. 1990); King v. King, No. 89-46-11 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (LEXIS, States library,
Tenn. file No. 675, at *31) (Koch, J., concurring).
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judicial process and the parties' interest in the integrity of the par-
ticular proceeding must be weighed against a party's interest in se-
lecting the counsel of her choice and the potential for substantial
hardship if her attorney is disqualified. 44 Nevertheless, most courts
hold that the right to counsel of choice must yield to upholding the
integrity of the judicial system .4 As one court stated, "a court must
not hesitate to disqualify an attorney when it is satisfactorily estab-
lished that he or she wrongfully acquired an unfair advantage that
undermines the integrity of the judicial process and will have a con-
tinuing effect on the proceedings before the court."46 The next section
will discuss the process used by courts in analyzing conflict of interest
breaches and the differences between the standards applied for con-
flicts with a former as opposed to an existing client.
B. Conflict of Interest Standards
If an attorney violates the conflict rules, the original client may
seek to have the attorney disqualified from the new representation.
In determining whether to grant the motion, courts use different stan-
dards depending on whether the conflict is with a former or an existing
client.
(1) Former Clients
When faced with a motion to disqualify an attorney for taking
a position adverse to a former client, most courts use the "substantial
relationship" test.47 A party moving to disqualify a law firm does not
need to show that her former attorney currently is involved in identical
litigation for the other side; she need only show that a lawyer-client
relationship previously existed and that there is a "substantial rela-
tionship" between the former and current representations. 4 But courts
44. Gregori, 207 Cal. App. 3d at 300, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
45. Id. at 301, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 858; see also; In re Paradyne Corp., 803 F.2d 604, 611
n.16 (llth Cir. 1986); Glueck v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 653 F.2d 746, 750 (2d Cir. 1981);
Comden v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 906, 915, 576 P.2d 971, 975, 145 Cal. Rptr. 9, 13,
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978).
46. Gregori, 207 Cal. App. 3d at 300, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 858 (citing Comden, 20 Cal. 3d
at 915, 576 P.2d at 975, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 13 and Chronometrics, Inc. v. Sysgen, Inc., 110
Cal. App. 3d 597, 607, 168 Cal. Rptr. 196, 202-03 (1980)).
47. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir.
1975); T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953);
Global Van Lines, Inc. v. Superior Court, 144 Cal. App. 3d 483, 489, 192 Cal. Rptr. 609,
613 (1983).
48. T.C. Theatre Corp., 113 F. Supp. at 268 ("the former client need show no more
than that the matters embraced within the pending suit wherein his former attorney appears
on behalf of his adversary are substantially related to the matters or cause of action wherein
the attorney previously represented him.").
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and commentators have struggled to formulate a definition of "sub-
stantial relationship. 4 9 Generally, courts will require proof that either
the legal issues or the subject matter of the two representations are
similar;50 yet the standards are not clear.
Some courts require a determination that the legal issues involved
in the two representations be "identical" or "essentially the same."'"
If the actual issues, and not just the subject matters, are not extremely
similar, the inquiry ends. In Government of India v. Cook Industries,
Inc.,5 2 for example, an attorney worked for a firm that defended Cook
in a lawsuit and did a substantial amount of work on the case. He
later went to work for a firm that represented a different plaintiff in
a different lawsuit against Cook. The court disqualified the lawyer and
his new firm because the two suits raised the same claims against the
same defendant and involved virtually identical legal issues. 3
A problem with the "legal issues" approach is that it is often
difficult to determine all the issues involved in a lawsuit at its outset.
And in a nonlitigation context issues may never be defined as clearly
as in a lawsuit.14 Because of the difficulty in determining the legal
issues involved in a representation, a former client's burden of proving
a substantial relationship between two representations may be insur-
mountable under this approach.5
Other courts compare the factual backgrounds of each represen-
tation to determine if a substantial relationship exists.16 The Seventh
Circuit formulated a three-part test to determine whether two repre-
sentations are substantially related:
Initially, the trial judge must make a factual reconstruction of the
scope of the prior legal representation. Second, it must be determined
whether it is reasonable to infer that the confidential information
49. See Note, Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession,
94 HARv. L. REv. 1244, 1325 (1981) ("Case law provides an uncertain definition of the term
['substantial relationship'] to concerned attorneys."); see also Silver Chrysler Plymouth, 518
F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1975) ("the cases furnish no applicable guide as to what creates a
'substantial' relationship").
50. Lawyers' Manual, supra note 12, at 51:205.
51. See, e.g., Silver Chrysler Plymouth, 518 F.2d at 754-56; Government of India v. Cook
Indus., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1057, 1059-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 569 F.2d 737, 739-40 (2d
Cir. 1978).
52. 422 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 569 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1978).
53. Id. at 739-40.
54. United States Football League v. National Football League, 605 F. Supp. 1448, 1459
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
55. See id.
56. See, e.g., Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F. 2d 1098, 1100 (10th Cir. 1985); Trone v. Smith,
621 F.2d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 1980); Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter Travenol
Laboratories, Inc., 607 F.2d 186, 190 (7th Cir. 1979).
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allegedly given would have been given to a lawyer representing a cli-
ent in those matters. Finally, it must be determined whether that in-
formation is relevant to the issues raised in the litigation pending
against the former client.57
Because it is easier for a client and her attorney to reconstruct the
factual background of the attorney's representation than to determine
in advance the legal issues involved, this approach is the better one.
Once the former client establishes a substantial relationship be-
tween the two representations, the court makes two presumptions. First,
the court presumes that the attorney received confidential information
during the prior representation; second, it presumes that those con-
fidences will be used on behalf of the new client and shared with other
members of the law firm. 58 The courts have applied these presumptions
inconsistently. Although some courts have held that the first pre-
sumption is irrebuttable, s9 most permit the presumption to be rebutted
by evidence that the attorney did not, in fact, receive any confidential
information during the previous representation.6 This is the approach
followed by the Model Rules.61 Whether or not the second presump-
57. Novo Terapeutisk, 607 F.2d at 190.
58. See, e.g., Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751,
754 (2d Cir. 1975) (rebuttable inference of receipt of confidential information); T.C. Theatre
Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (receipt of
confidential information assumed); Global Van Lines, Inc. 'v. Superior Court, 144 Cal. App.
3d 483, 489, 192 Cal. Rptr. 609, 613 (1983) (receipt of confidential information presumed; no
showing of actual use required). In Global Van Lines, the court noted:
When a substantial relationship has been shown to exist between the former repre-
sentation and the current representation, and when it appears by virtue of the nature
of the former representation or the relationship of the attorney to his former client
confidential information material to the current dispute would normally have been
imparted to the attorney or to subordinates for whose legal work he was responsible,
the attorney's knowledge of confidential information is presumed.
144 Cal. App. 3d at 489, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
59. Whatcott, 757 F.2d at 1100; Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prod. Co., 605 F.2d 380, 384
(8th Cir. 1979), overruled on other grounds sub nom. In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liability,
612 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449
U.S. 368 (1981); see also Government of India v. Cook Indus. Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1057, 1060
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (court gave no weight to attorney's testimony that he had no access to, and
did not receive, privileged information while representing the client in a prior case), aff'd, 569
F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1978).
60. See, e.g., LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 256 (7th Cir. 1983);
Silver Chrysler Plymouth, 518 F.2d at 754; Global Van Lines, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 489, 192
Cal. Rptr. at 613.
61. MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(b) (1989); see supra note 39. The
comment to this Rule notes that some lawyers have access to the files of all clients, in which
case it should be presumed that these lawyers acquired confidential information about all
clients. Some lawyers in a firm, however, may have access to only a limited number of clients'
files, and "in the absence of information to the contrary, it should be inferred that such a
lawyer in fact is privy to information about the clients actually served but not those of other
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tion is rebuttable involves the issue of vicarious disqualification of the
firm, which is discussed below. 62
(2) Existing Clients
Generally, courts apply a stricter standard in cases involving con-
flicts between existing clients than in cases involving former clients. 63
This is because the rules prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client
with interests adverse to another client are based not only on the pro-
tection of confidences and secrets, but also on the lawyer's duty of
loyalty to her client. 64 This duty of loyalty requires attorneys to pursue
their "client's interests diligently and vigorously within the limits of
the law.'"'6 Thus, a lawyer may not represent a client if that repre-
sentation will have an adverse effect on the lawyer's independent judg-
ment or her relationship with another client. 6
Although the Model Code and Model Rules do not define "ad-
verse effect," courts will presume an adverse effect when an attorney
represents an interest that conflicts with interests of a present client. 67
For example, if a law firm defends a client in a lawsuit brought by
one plaintiff, it cannot represent a different plaintiff against that client
even if the suits are not substantially related and even if the two cases
are handled by different offices of the firm. This is true even if the
representations are totally unrelated.69 As a result, most courts hold
that the representation of two clients with adverse interests is improper
clients." Id. comment; see also Silver Chrysler Plymouth, 518 F.2d at 756 (observing that a
lawyer who is intricately involved in a legal matter differs from one who enters "briefly on
the periphery for a limited and specific purpose relating solely to legal questions."). Under
the Silver Chrysler Plymouth approach, the extent of the lawyer's involvement in the former
representation determines whether or not the presumption is rebuttable.
62. See infra Part II.C.
63. See, e.g., Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1344-45 (9th Cir.
1981); International Business Mach. Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 1978); Cinema
5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1387 (2d Cir. 1976); Harte Biltmore, Ltd. v. First
Pa. Bank, 655 F. Supp. 419, 420-21 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
64. Unified Sewerage Agency, 646 F.2d at 1345; Cinema 5, Ltd., 528 F.2d at 1386.
65. Greene v. Greene, 47 N.Y.2d 447, 451, 391 N.E.2d 1355, 1357, 418 N.Y.S.2d 379,
381 (1979); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7.
66. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsirirrY DR 5-101(A) (1981); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1989).
67. Unified Sewerage, 646 F.2d at 1345 (court presumes adverse effect when law firm
represents a client suing an existing client).
68. Cinema 5, Ltd., 528 F.2d at 1387.
69. E.g., Ransburg Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 648 F. Supp. 1040, 1045 (N.D.
Ill. 1986) (it is unethical for an attorney to sue one client on behalf of another client without
the consent of the parties, "even if the subject matter of the representations is unrelated").
1680 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42
on its face and, therefore, the substantial relationship test is inap-
propriate. 70
C. Vicarious Disqualification
When a lawyer is disqualified for violating the conflict of interest
rules, it often results in the vicarious disqualification of the entire firm. 71
This rule is based on the premise that all lawyers in a law firm have
access to confidential information about all the firm's clients and on
the principle that each lawyer in a law firm has a duty of loyalty to
all clients represented by the firm. 72 When the conflict involves an
existing client, no attorney in the firm can represent the adverse in-
terest.73 When the conflict involves a former client, the issue of vi-
carious disqualification arises when a new lawyer joins a firm that is
either currently representing, or later begins representing, interests ad-
verse to a former client of the lawyer. In the former client case, courts
presume that the attorney with the conflict will use or share the client's
information at the new firm.74 The reason for this presumption is that
parties seeking disqualification should not have to prove what dis-
closures actually were made. In Woods v. Superior Court,75 for ex-
ample, the court noted, "[T]he test does not require the 'former' client
to show that actual confidences were disclosed. That inquiry would
be improper as requiring the very disclosure the rule is intended to
protect. It is the possibility of the breach of confidence, not the fact
of the breach, that triggers disqualification. 7 6
Traditionally, courts have applied a per se rule of vicarious dis-
qualification. If a lawyer with actual knowledge of a client's confi-
70. Cinema 5, Ltd., 528 F.2d at 1387; see also Unified Sewerage, 646 F.2d at 1345 (no
specific adverse effect need be shown); International Business Mach. Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d
271, 280 (3d Cir. 1978) (same).
71. MODEL RUtLS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1989). This Rule provides in
pertinent part, "While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent
a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so .....
Id.
Under the Model Code, DR 5-105(D) provides: "If a lawyer is required to decline employment
or to withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner, or associate, or any
other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, may accept or continue such employment."
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSrIIUTY DR 5-105(D) (1981).
72. MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 comment (1989); Cinema 5, Ltd.,
528 F.2d at 1387; State ex rel. Freezer Serv., Inc. v. Mullen, 235 Neb. 981, 988, 458 N.W.2d
245, 250 (1990).
73. Unified Sewerage, 646 F.2d at 1345; Cinema 5, Ltd., 528 F.2d at 1387.
74. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 659 F.2d 1341, 1346 (5th Cir. .1981).
75. 149 Cal. App. 3d 931, 197 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1983).
76. Id. at 934, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
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dential information joins a firm opposing that client in a substantially
related matter, an irrebuttable presumption arises that the lawyer will
share that information with other lawyers in the new firm." This is
the approach taken by the Model Rules.7 8 The rationale for this rule
appears to be that even the most well-intentioned and scrupulous law-
yer may inadvertently use confidential information or disclose such
information to other lawyers in the firm.79
Some courts, however, refuse to irrebuttably presume that the
lawyer will disclose the protected information at her new firm. 0 There-
77. See, e.g., In re Corrugated Container, 659 F.2d at 1347 (irrebuttable presumption of
transfer of client's confidences to other partners in law firm); Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513
F.2d 568, 572 (2d Cir. 1975) (when a lawyer actually has received confidential information,
court must disqualify both the lawyer and the new firm to preserve confidentiality); Weglarz
v. Bruck, 128 Ill. App. 3d 1, 5, 470 N.E.2d 21, 24 (1984) (attorney can rebut presumption
only when she shows "clearly and effectively" that she in fact did not receive any confidential
information at the first firm); State ex rel Freezer Servs., Inc., 235 Neb. at 992, 458 N.W.2d
at 252 ("irrebuttable presumption of shared confidences"); see also C. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETmcs § 7.6.4. at 401-04 (1986) (impracticalities of screening and inability to detect
breach call for irrebuttable presumption).
78. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.9, 1.10 (1989). Rule 1.9(b)
makes the law firm's vicarious disqualification dependent upon the transferring lawyer's actual
knowledge of information protected by Rules 1.6 (confidentiality of information) and 1.9(c)
(see supra note 39). Thus, if the lawyer rebuts the first presumption of the substantial
relationship test-that the lawyer acquired confidential information from the former client-
and shows that she was not privy to any confidential information about the former client,
neither the lawyer nor the new firm will be disqualified. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.9 comment (1989). One commentator has observed that "[t]he courts have
not gone so far as to adopt a 'double imputation' theory .... The imputation of knowledge
of client confidences therefore stops with the partners (past or present) of one with actual
knowledge, while the partners of an attorney with imputed knowledge remain free from taint."
Liebman, The Changing Law of Disqualification: The Role of Presumption and Policy, 73
Nw. U.L. Rv. 996, 1000 n.18 (1979) (emphasis in original).
If the lawyer actually acquired confidential information at the prior firm, however, the
entire new firm will be vicariously disqualified. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.10 comment (1989). The lawyer is not given an opportunity to rebut the second presumption
of the substantial relationship test-that she will share the confidential information with other
members of the firm. The only exception to Model Rule 1.10 involves government lawyers
who move to private practice, for which there is an express provision under Rule 1.11(a)
allowing a private firm to rebut the presumption by showing that the lawyer who acquired
confidential information in an earlier governmental capacity has been screened from the matter.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (a). The rationale for allowing private firms
to screen former government lawyers is the need for the government to attract well-qualified
lawyers by not restricting their ability to go into private practice later. See Note, Government
Lawyers & Conflicts of Interest, 3 GEO. J. L. ETmIcs 191, 196 (1989) (authored by Stephen
Curran).
79. See, e.g., Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973).
80. Manning v. Waring, 849 F.2d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1988) (screening devices can be
effective to rebut presumption of shared confidences); Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417,
421 (7th Cir. 1983) (entire firm disqualified only because no screening mechanism was set up
to avoid vicarious disqualification); Geisler v. Wyeth Laboratories, 716 F. Supp. 520, 526 (D.
[Vol. 42
fore, even if the court disqualifies the lawyer, the firm need not with-
draw or be disqualified so long as the lawyer does not disclose any
confidential information at her new firm. In the leading case of Schies-
sle v. Stephens,"' the Seventh Circuit adopted a three-step test to de-
termine whether a firm may continue to represent a client after .one
of the lawyers in the firm has been disqualified for a conflict of in-
terest: (1) determine whether a substantial relationship exists between
the subject matter of the prior and present representations; if so, (2)
ascertain whether the presumption that the lawyer obtained confi-
dences of the client at the previous firm has been rebutted; and if not,
(3) determine whether the presumption that the lawyer shared those
confidences at the present firm has been rebutted . 2 Although not uni-
versally followed, 3 the Schiessle test is gaining popularity due to in-
creasing concern with the abuse of disqualification motions and with
safeguarding the right to the counsel of one's choice.84
Law firms most commonly rebut the presumption of shared con-
fidences by screening the disqualified lawyer from any and all in-
volvement in the matter. The Model Rules expressly approve the use
of an "ethical wall," 's5 but only in the case of a government lawyer
moving into private practice.8 6 Many courts, however, have extended
this rule to private attorneys who relocate. For example, in Nemours
Kan. 1989) (firm-wide disqualification unnecessary when disqualified attorney effectively screened);
Nemours Found. v. Gilbane, 632 F. Supp. 418, 428 (1D. Del. 1986) (appropriate screening
mechanism may rebut the presumption of shared confidences under Model Rule 1.10, even
though reliance on screening has been expressly sanctioned only in Model Rule 1.11 governing
former government attorneys); Lemair v. Texaco, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1308, 1310 (E.D. Tex.
1980) (presumption of shared confidences is rebuttable).
81. 717 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1983).
82. Id. at 420-21.
83. See Huntington v. Great W. Resources, Inc. 655 F. Supp. 565, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(disqualification is automatic where attorney represents a client against former client in a
substantially related matter, where attorney "was likely to have had access to confidential
information of former client"); Weglarz v. Bruck, 128 Ill. App. 3d 1, 6, 470 N.E.2d 21, 25
(1984) (where substantial relationship shown, presumption of shared confidences is irrebuttable);
State ex rel Freezer Servs., Inc. v. Mullen, 235 Neb. 981, 992-93, 458 N.W.2d 245, 252-53
(1990) (rejecting rebuttability of presumption of shared confidences).
84. See Manning, 849 F.2d at 225-26; Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg., 744 F.2d
1564, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Geisler, 716 F. Supp. at 526-27; Skokie Gold Standard Liquors,
Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. 116 11. App. 3d 1043, 1057-58, 452 N.E.2d 804, 814-
15 (1983).
85. Many courts and commentators refer to this screening mechanism as a "Chinese
Wall." An excellent discussion of the defense is found in Moser, Chinese Walls: A Means of
Avoiding Law Firm Disqualification When a Personally Disqualified Lawyer Joins the Firm,
3 GEO. J. L. ETHICS 399 (1990). Nevertheless, to avoid any ethnic or racial connotations, the
phrase "ethical wall" will be used in this Note to refer to screening an attorney from a
particular matter.
86. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSION AL CotNucr Rule 1.11 (1989).
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Foundation v. Gilbane,8 7 the court held that the law firm opposing
a motion to disqualify could rebut the presumption of shared con-
fidences by setting up an ethical wall even though the transferring law-
yer came from a private firm.88 Although the attorney with the conflict
was disqualified, the firm was able to continue representing its client.
Formal screening, however, is not the only way to rebut the pre-
sumption of shared confidences, and courts generally determine on a
case-by-case basis whether or not confidences actually were shared. 9
The conflict of interest rules, although not uniformly applied,
serve to protect the interests of clients, the fairness of litigation, and
the integrity of the judicial process. But without protection against
support staff conflicts of interest, these rules leave a major loophole.
Employees change law firms quite often, and it is time to recognize
that this, too, can create a risk of conflict.
III. Support Staff Conflict of Interest
Established law in the area of nonlawyer side-switching is very
limited. What little there is has not been applied consistently by the
courts and ethics panels. The cases and ethics opinions regarding this
problem can be broken down roughly into three categories: those that
rely solely on the appearance of impropriety, those that use a com-
bination of attorney confidentiality rules and the appearance of im-
propriety, and those that apply attorney conflict of interest rules to
the nonlawyer. Within a given category, however, the approach is not
always uniform. This Part will delineate the various approaches taken
by courts and ethics panels in dealing with the issue of nonlawyer side-
switching and analyze their effectiveness.
A. Appearance of Impropriety
Courts struggle with two problems when faced with the issue of
whether to disqualify an attorney on the basis of an employee's con-
flict of interest. First, the ethical rules that apply to lawyers do not
apply to their nonlawyer employees. Second, the ethical rules do not
87. 632 F. Supp. 418 f(D. Del. 1986).
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg., 744 F.2d 1564, 1580 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (firm may rebut presumption with testimonial evidence, even without formal screening);
Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C & 0 Enters., 637 F. Supp. 1231, 1240 (N.D. Il. 1985) (absence of
formal ethical wall does not per se require disqualification), aff'd 886 F.2d 1485 (7th Cir.
1989); Lemaire v. Texaco, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1308, 1310 (E.D. Tex. 1980) (uncontradicted
testimony that no confidences have been or will be shared is sufficient to rebut presumption).
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prohibit a lawyer herself from receiving confidential information from
a former employee of an adversary. 90 Canon 9 of the Model Code,
however, broadly prohibits the "appearance of impropriety." 9'
This Canon is, theoretically, the only canon or ethical rule that
applies to the hiring lawyer; in hiring an employee from an opponent's
law firm, she creates an appearance of impropriety in violation of the
Canon. In a very thorough analysis of nonlawyer conflicts of interest,
the court in Williams v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.92 relied solely on
the appearance of impropriety in granting the defendant's motion to
disqualify the plaintiffs' law firm from several actions against the de-
fendant. 93 Although this case did not involve an employee moving from
one firm to another, it did involve similar conflict of interest problems.
The plaintiffs' firm previously had represented two clients in an age
discrimination suit against TWA. One of TWA's employees had as-
sisted the firm in the defense of these claims. More than one year after
the litigation began, the employee was laid off and subsequently brought
her own discrimination suit against TWA. The employee hired the firm
representing the original two plaintiffs to represent her as well. TWA
then moved to disqualify the plaintiffs' firm because it had acquired
confidential information from TWA's former employee.9 4 In granting
the motion, the court observed that a nonlawyer may be more likely
to reveal confidential information than a lawyer, because the non-
lawyer lacks the lawyer's awareness of the ethical obligation to pre-
serve the confidences and secrets of her clients. 95 The court stated:
Non-lawyer personnel are widely used by lawyers to assist in
rendering legal services. Paralegals, investigators, and secretaries must
have ready access to client confidences in order to assist their attorney
employers. If information provided by a client in confidence to an
attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice could be used against
the client because a member of the attorney's non-lawyer support
staff left the attorney's employment, it would have a devastating ef-
fect both on the free flow of information between client and attorney
and on the cost and quality of the legal services rendered by an at-
torney. Every departing secretary, investigator, or paralegal would
90. A disqualification case involving support staff side-switching is yet another "square
peg which does not fit into the round holes of the rules most commonly applied in attorney
disqualification cases." William H. Raley Co. v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 1042,
1049-50 n.3, 197 Cal. Rptr. 232, 238 n.3 (1983) (partner in plaintiffs law firm was on board
of directors of bank that was trustee of all of defendant's stock).
91. This Canon provides: "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional
Impropriety." MoDEL CODE OF PRoFrssoNALx REsPoNsmnuTY Canon 9 (1981).
92. 588 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
93. Id. at 1046.
94. Id. at 1040.
95. Id. at 1043.
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be free to impart confidential information to the opposition without
effective restraint. The only practical way to assure that this will not
happen and to preserve public trust in the scrupulous administration
of justice is to subject these "agents" of lawyers to the same dis-
ability lawyers have when they leave legal employment with confi-
dential information.9 6
If the court's holding were taken literally, it could have extremely far
reaching effects. It is not hard to imagine using this rationale to hold
that an employee who works for a company on legal issues can never
sue her former employer because her attorney would always receive
confidential information. It is also not hard to imagine using this ra-
tionale to hold that an attorney who does represent an employee in
a suit against her former employer can never bring any other suits
against that company that are substantially related.
Needless to say, the opinion has not been stretched that far. To
the contrary, the above quote is often cited in employee side-switching
cases. In this respect, the opinion has been very influential.
For example, in Lackow v. Walter E. Heller & Co.,97 the court
relied on Canon 9 and Williams in holding that a secretary's switching
sides during litigation, and the resultant appearance of impropriety,
was a sufficient basis for disqualifying the hiring law firm.98 Drawing
its rationale from doctrines governing attorney conflicts, the court set
out a strict rule pertaining to nonlawyer conflicts of interest: once the
moving party proves that the nonlawyer was privy to confidential in-
formation regarding the instant litigation through her previous em-
ployment with the opposing counsel's firm, the court must disqualify
the hiring firm to avoid any appearance of impropriety. 99
Although California does not have an "appearance of impro-
priety" standard, 1°° in Gregori v. Bank of America,10' the plaintiffs'
law firm was disqualified because one of its attorneys began a secret,
intimate relationship with a secretary of the defendant's law firm.1°2
96. Id. at 1044.
97. 466 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
98. Id. at 1123.
99. Id. ("Whether [the secretary] actually violated or would violate the confidences is not
a subject of inquiry."). But see Esquire Care, Inc. v. Maguire, 532 So. 2d 740, 742 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1988) (disapproving Lackow's irrebuttable presumption that confidences have been
or will be disclosed). For a discussion of Esquire, see infra notes 145-149 and accompanying
text.
100. California has not adopted either the Model Rules or the Model Code. The attorney
conflict rules are found at CAL. RUtLs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-310 (1989). Rule 3-
310(D) provides: "A member shall not accept employment adverse to a client or former client,
where, by reason of the representation of the client or former client, the member has obtained
confidential information material to the employment except with the informed written consent
of the client or former client." CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-310(D) (1989).
101. Gregori v. Bank of Am., 207 Cal. App. 3d 291, 254 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1989).
102. 1d. at 313, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 867. In Gregori, The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial
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The court noted that attorney conflict of interest rules do not apply
to cases in which the attorney is not representing any adverse interests'03
and that none of the other provisions of California's ethical rules
"explicitly proscribe" the attorney's conduct.' 4 Thus, the defendant
could argue only that the conduct had given rise to an appearance of
impropriety. Although the court agreed that the behavior was uneth-
ical, it found that the record did not contain sufficient evidence to
support a holding that the attorney had, in fact, acquired any useful
information from the secretary, and remanded the case for further
findings. 05
Although some courts have held that an appearance of impro-
priety alone is sufficient to support the disqualification of counsel,106
most courts criticize using Canon 9 as the sole basis for disqualifi-
cation." 7 One court noted that "[t]he standard is too imprecise to fur-
nish a reliable judicial guideline. For one thing, it is unclear as to whom
the conduct in question must appear improper.' ' 0 8 Since courts are
reluctant to rely solely on Canon 9 to support disqualification, it can-
not be relied on to protect the client.
B. Confidentiality Rules and the Appearance of Impropriety
Although most courts hesitate to disqualify an attorney or her law
firm because of an appearance of impropriety, some courts will rely
court's denial of disqualification but ordered further discovery on the extent of the relationship
and the amount of confidential information that might have been revealed. Id. On remand,
the trial court found a "reasonable probability" that the attorney had received valuable
confidential information from the secretary and ordered disqualification. See Aronson, Counsel
Axed for Dating Adversary's Secretary, San Francisco Recorder, Sept. 13, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
103. Gregori, 207 Cal. App. 3d at 299 n.3, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 858 n.3.
104. Id. at 302, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 859 (emphasis in original).
105. Id. at 309, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 864-65. See supra note 102.
106. See, e.g., Williams v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 1037, 1042 (W.D.
Mo. 1984) (plaintiffs' firm disqualified for obtaining confidential client information from
former nonlawyer employee of defendant); Lackow v. Waiter E. Heller & Co., 466 So. 2d
1120, 1123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (disqualification of plaintiff's law firm for hiring
secretary with confidential information from defendant's law firm which created appearance
of impropriety).
107. See, e.g., -Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979) (the mere
appearance of impropriety "is simply too slender a reed on which to rest a disqualification
order.") Gabianelli v. Azar, 777 P.2d 1167, 1169 (Alaska 1989) (appearance of impropriety
alone is insufficient to support disqualification except in the rarest cases); Gregori,' 207 Cal.
App. 3d at 307, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 863 (the appearance of impropriety standard does not
provide a reliable guideline).
In addition, many commentators have criticized the use of the "appearance of impropriety"
standard. See, e.g., Kramer, The Appearance of Impropriety Under Canon 9: A Study of the
Federal Judicial Process Applied to Lawyers, 65 MINN. L. REV. 243, 264-65 (1980); O'Toole,
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: An Elusive Ethical Guideline, 62
MARQtEar L. REv. 313, 344-50 (1979).
108. Gregor!, 207 Cal. App. 3d at 307, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 863 (emphasis in original).
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on a combination of Canon 9 and the duty to preserve client con-
fidences in determining whether disqualification is appropriate.'°9 The
Tennessee Court of Appeals recently confronted the issue of support
staff side-switching in King v. King. 0 In this divorce case, the plaintiff
filed a motion to disqualify the defendant's counsel because a former
secretary of the plaintiff's attorney left to work for the defendant's
attorneys."' The trial court relied primarily on an ethics opinion that
indicated the defendant's attorneys had to be disqualified. 12 Between
the time of the trial court's decision and the appeal, the Tennessee
Board of Professional Responsibility issued another ethics opinion
substantially modifying the earlier one. 3 According to the latter opin-
ion, courts should follow the Schiessle three-step test" 4 in all attorney
conflict of interest cases and should apply disqualification rules and
screening procedures to law clerks, paralegals, and legal secretaries as
well."15
Although giving this opinion thorough consideration, the King
court did not follow it, noting:
The interpretations by the Board of Professional Responsibility of
the Rules of the Supreme Court which it was created to enforce are
entitled to weight and consideration by the Courts, but no authority
is found requiring the Courts to enforce such an interpretation except
in a review of disciplinary action by the Board." 6
The court instead based its analysis of the issue on DR 4-101 and Canon
9. Because the evidence did not show that the secretary either received
109. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Dean Food Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380, 385 (8th Cir. 1979)
(Canon 4 is "inextricably wedded to Canon 9"), overruled on other grounds sub nom. In re
Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liab. Litig., 612 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 757 (2d Cir. 1975) ("Although Canon 9 dictates that doubts
should be resolved in favor of disqualification . . . it is not intended completely to override
the delicate balance created by Canon 4 and the decisions thereunder."); King v. King, No.
89-46-11 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (LEXIS, States library, Tenn. file No. 675) (most courts
"consider both Canon 4 and Canon 9 when confronted with the dilemma created by a law
firm representing interests potentially antagonistic to a former client").
110. No. 89-46-11 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (LEXIS, States library, Tenn. file No. 675).
111. Id. at *3.
112. Tenn. Bd. of Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. F-110 (1987).
113. Tenn. Bd. of Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. F-118 (1989).
114. See supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
115. Tenn. Bd. of Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. F-118 (1989).
116. King v. King, No. 89-46-11 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (LEXIS, States library, Tenn. file
No. 675, at *15). But see the concurring opinion of Judge Koch, who notes: "Even though
the formal ethics opinions do not have the weight of precedent, their importance should not
be denigrated by judicial indifference because, like the Code of Professional Responsibility,
they represent the acknowledged standards of the profession." Id. at *29-30. Judge Koch
would apply the Schiessle three-step analysis to disqualification cases involving nonlawyers.
Id. at *36-37.
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confidential information from the plaintiff or revealed any to the de-
fendant's attorneys, the court held that disqualification was inappro-
priate. 117
The Arkansas Supreme Court reached a similar result in Herron
v. Jones.I" In Herron, a secretary for the plaintiffs' firm went to work
for the defendant's firm. The evidence established that the secretary
had been warned not to discuss confidential information about the
case, that she did not work on the case at the new firm, and that the
file was kept away from her in the attorney's own office. Therefore,
the court reasoned, the secretary could not have received any con-
fidential information." 9 The court held that, although the duty to pre-
serve the confidences of clients "applies to all the employees of a law
firm," Canon 9 applies only to lawyers and does not by itself con-
stitute a sufficient basis on which to order disqualification12° The court
further noted that any presumption of impropriety resulting from the
secretary's changing firms during litigation clearly had been rebutted
by the evidence that the secretary had not revealed any secrets.12'
C. Attorney Conflict of Interest Rules
While courts recognize that attorney conflict of interest rules ap-
ply only to lawyers,- some follow a similar analysis when confronting
conflict of interest issues involving nonlawyers. These cases fall into
two categories-those that apply the Schiessle v. Stevens-3 three-step
analysis and those that do not.
(1) Application of the Schiessle Three-Step Analysis
In Kapco Manufacturing Co. v. C & 0 Enterprises, Inc.,- 4 the
court applied Schiessle to resolve a motion to disqualify a firm for
hiring a secretary-office manager from an adversary.- 5 Under the
Schiessle test, the court first must determine whether a substantial re-
lationship exists between the lawyer's prior and present representa-
tions. As the Kapco court noted, however, the secretary in this case
117. Id. at *20-22.
118. 276 Ark. 493, 637 S.W.2d 569 (1982).
119. Id. at 496, 637 S.W.2d at 571.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Preliminary Statement, supra note 1.
123. 717 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1983). For a discussion of Schiessle, see supra text accompanying
notes 81-82.
124. 637 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Il. 1985).
125. Id. at 1236.
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did not "represent" either client. 26 Therefore, the court concluded,
the correct inquiry was whether a "substantial nexus" existed between
the work performed by the secretary for her former employer and the
work she performed for her current employer.1 27 Second, the court
must determine whether the hiring firm has rebutted the presumption
that the secretary received confidences at her prior firm. 2" If so, the
secretary's employment with the adversary can have no improper ef-
fect on the outcome of the litigation. If not, the court must proceed
to the third step and determine whether the hiring firm has rebutted
the presumption that the secretary has shared confidences with her new
employer.129 In concluding that the second presumption of the Schies-
sle test should apply to the case of a nonlawyer, the Kapco court relied
on Williams v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 30 for the proposition that
an employee may be more likely than an attorney to disclose confi-
dences inadvertently.13' Finding that the hiring firm effectively had
rebutted this presumption, the Kapco court denied the motion for dis-
qualification. 32
This three-step approach also was adopted by the ABA in an in-
formal ethics opinion. 3 3 The ABA opinion was solicited by a firm that
wanted to hire a paralegal who had worked on a lawsuit with her for-
mer employer against a client of the hiring firm. The Standing Com-
mittee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility concluded that the
firm would not be disqualified as long as it "strictly adhere[d]" to
screening procedures designed to prevent protected information from
being revealed.134 The Committee expressly noted that once the moving
126. Id. at 1237 n.13.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1237.
129. Id.
130. 588 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
131. Kapco, 637 F. Supp. at 1238.
132. Id. at 1241. The court also held that a hiring firm may rebut this presumption even
though it has not set up a formal ethical wall. Id. at 1240.
133. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1526 at 1
(1988), holds:
A law firm that employs a nonlawyer who formerly was employed by another firm
may continue representing clients whose interests conflict with the interests of clients
of the former employer on whose matters the nonlawyer has worked, as long as the
employing firm screens the nonlawyer from information about or participating in
matters involving those clients and strictly adheres to the screening process described
in this opinion and as long as no information relating to the representation of the
clients of the former employer is revealed by the nonlawyer to any person in the
employing firm.
The opinion further comments that if the nonlawyer actually reveals any confidential infor-
mation to the hiring firm, or if screening would not be effective, the firm should withdraw
or be disqualified. Id. at 4.
134. Id. at 2.
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party establishes that the employee obtained confidences from her prior
firm, the burden shifts to the hiring firm to rebut the presumption
that those confidences will be shared at the new firm.1 35 This opinion
makes great strides toward resolving employee conflict of interest
questions, but, while influential, it is not binding on state courts.
(2) No Formal Three-Step Test Applied
Some courts apply an attorney conflict of interest analysis to non-
lawyers, but do not adopt the formal three-step test or its corre-
sponding presumptions. In the redent California case of Widger v.
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (In re Complex Asbestos Litiga-
tion),16 the court upheld the disqualification of a law firm from nine
asbestos cases because the law firm hired a paralegal who previously
worked for an asbestos defense firm. 37 Because this was a case of first
impression in California, the court gave a very thorough analysis to
the problem of nonlawyer side-switching. The court based its analysis
on cases involving the question of whether an entire law firm should
be vicariously disqualified for hiring an attorney with a conflict of
interest. 38 The court held:
The party seeking disqualification must show that its present or past
attorney's former employee possesses confidential attorney-client in-
formation materially related to the proceedings before the court....
Once this showing has been made, a rebuttable presumption arises
that the information has been used or disclosed in the current em-
ployment.... To rebut the presumption, the challenged attorney has
the burden of showing that the practical effect of formal screening
has been achieved.139
The ruling is important for several reasons. First, it recognizes that,
although the duty to protect client confidences belongs to the attorney
135. Id. (citing Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C & 0 Enter., Inc., 637 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Ill.
1985)).
136. No. A047921, slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 19, 1991) The trial court originally
disqualified the attorney from twenty cases, but amended its order to include only those cases
pending in San Francisco Superior Court. See id. at 11; Hall, S.F. Decision on Paralegal
Conflict May Plague Firms: 'Pandora's Box' Opened?, L.A. Daily Journal, Sept. 25, 1989,
at 1, col. 2. Both parties appealed. The disqualified attorney claimed he should not have been
disqualified from any cases; defendants cross-appealed claiming he should have been disqualified
from all asbestos cases against them in the state. The author helped research the defendants'
cross-appeal last summer, and that is where she got the idea for this Note. The disqualified
attorney has indicated that he intends to appeal the order to the California Supreme Court.
Carrizosa, Asbestos Plaintiffs Firm's Disqualification Is Affirmed, San Francisco Daily J.,
July 22, 1991, at 1, col. 2. As of the date of this publication, however, no notice has been
filed.
137. Id. at 2-3.
138. Id. at 25.
139. Id. at 30-31.
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representing the client, it reasons that attorneys who hire employees
from opposing counsel must be regulated. 140 Second, the court ex-
pressly rejected the substantial relationship test as a means of pre-
suming that the employee acquired confidential information while
employed at the former firm.14 1 Understandably, the court felt that
this was too broad a rule for support staff. What the court really was
rejecting, however, was the presumption itself and the that the two
representations had to be substantially related. 42 Finally, the court
applied a rebuttable presumption, adapted from vicarious disquali-
fication cases, that the employee would use or disclose confidential
information at the new firm. 143 This case is by far the most compre-
hensive analysis of the risks posed by employee conflicts of interest
and should be adopted in other states.
In Esquire Care, Inc. v. Maguire, 44 the court refused to disqualify
the plaintiffs' law firm after the firm hired a secretary from the de-
fendant's law firm in the midst of ongoing litigation. The Esquire court
recognized that a conflict of interest could arise in such situations and
noted:
In determining whether an individual is privy to attorney-client con-
fidences, a court should not look to what tasks the employee per-
forms so much as to his or her access to the same types of privileged
materials that lawyers would receive. That a secretary may make no
lawyerlike decisions, or counsel clients, does not mean he or she is
not privy to confidential communications. 45
The Esquire court expressly distinguished Lackow v. Walter E. Heller
& Co. 146and refused to presume that the secretary would disclose any
confidential information. 47 Absent any proof that the secretary's
change of employment created an unfair advantage in the litigation,
disqualification would not be proper. 48
Other courts have held that, if a law firm hires a nonlawyer who
has obtained confidential information as an employee at another firm
140. Id. at 16.
141. Id. at 28-29.
142. Id. at 29-30. The court required that the information be "materially related" to the
new representation. Given the difficulty courts have in defining a "substantial relationship,"
it opens a whole new question to define "material relationship."
143. Id. at 26.
144. 532 So. 2d 740 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
145. Id. at 741.
146. 466 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). See supra text accompanying notes 97-
99.
147. Esquire, 532 So. 2d at 742.
148. Id.; see also Florida Bar Professional Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 86-5 (1986) (placing
joint responsibility on the former law firm and the hiring law firm to prevent client confidences
and secrets from being disclosed). The Esquire court considered this opinion in reaching its
conclusion. See 532 So. 2d at 742.
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that represents adverse interests, the hiring firm automatically must
be disqualified; no screening mechanism is allowed to rebut any pre-
sumption of shared confidences. 149 In Glover Bottled Gas Corp. v.
Circle M. Beverage Barn, Inc.,150 the court summarily disqualified the
hiring firm without discussing whether the employee revealed confi-
dential information. 5 1 A paralegal had left the plaintiff's law firm and
gone to work for the defendants' attorneys. The evidence showed that
the paralegal had worked on the litigation and had interviewed the
plaintiff's manager while employed by the former firm. 52 The Glover
court held that the Code of Professional Responsibility requires at-
torneys to ensure that their employees' conduct complies with the Code,
and it disqualified the defendant's firm for a conflict of interest.1 53
In 1989 the Alabama State Bar Disciplinary Commission issued
two opinions addressing similar issues: one involved the potential dis-
qualification of the hiring firm where a legal secretary had switched
sides; 154 the other involved a legal investigator who had switched sides.1 55
In both opinions, the Commission concluded that it would be uneth-
ical for the hiring firm to continue to represent clients in cases on
which the nonlawyer previously had worked for the opponent.1 56 The
Commission relied on the fact that each of the nonlawyers occupied
a position of trust and had access not only to client confidences, but
also to confidences and secrets regarding trial strategy and tactics. 5 7
In the case involving the legal investigator, the Commission noted that
the situation was so serious that the "mere erection of a[n ethical]
wall" would be insufficient.' 58
149. Glover Bottled Gas Corp. v. Circle M. Beverage Barn, Inc., 129 A.D.2d 678, 514
N.Y.S.2d 440 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); see also Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 572 (2d
Cir. 1975) (court disqualified attorney without any inquiry into whether or not the employee
in fact disclosed any confidences); Williams v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 1037,
1043 (W.D. Mo. 1984) ("To hold a hearing on whether [the employee] has conveyed confidential
information would very likely compromise the confidences."); Lackow v. Walter E. Heller &
Co., 466 So. 2d 1120, 1123 (Fla. Ct. App. 1985) ("Whether [the secretary] actually violated
or would violate the confidences is not a subject of inquiry.").
150. 129 A.D.2d 678, 514 N.Y.S.2d 440 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
151. Id. at 679, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 441.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Ala. State Bar Disciplinary Comm., Op. 81 (1989) [hereinafter Opinion 81].
155. Ala. State Bar Disciplinary Comm., Op. 89-41 (1989) [hereinafter Opinion 41].
156. Id. at 2; Opinion 81, supra note 154, at 2.
157. Opinion 81, supra note 154, at 2; Opinion 41, supra note 155, at 2.
158. Opinion 41, supra note 155, at 2; cf. Opinion 81, supra note 154, at 2 ("While it
may be possible to build a [n ethical wall] around certain employees or to screen employees
from information so as to prevent disqualification, such did not occur in this case, and, in
any event, probably would be impractical in this or a similar scenario.") (emphasis added).
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It appears, then, that a uniform analysis has not been developed
for nonlawyer employee conflicts of interest. Although most courts
that confront the issue recognize that a problem exists, 15 9 there is no
readily available, satisfactory remedy. The next Part proposes that
states adopt legislation that explicitly regulates support staff conflicts
of interest. It also proposes a method of analysis for courts to apply
when confronted with the issue. This would provide both a bright line
rule to follow and a workable test to apply when that line is crossed.
IV. What Rules Should Apply?
The recurring theme in cases involving nonlawyer side-switching
is the lack of guidance under existing state ethical rules, which gen-
erally have incorporated the provisions of either the Model Code or
Model Rules, as to when an apparent conflict of interest mandates
disqualification of the hiring attorney or firm. Courts often are trapped
by an obvious ethical breach and the lack of means to remedy it. 16
At the same time, any disqualification motion can disrupt the liti-
gation, resulting in unnecessary delay and undue hardship on the par-
ties involved. Lawyers are in a difficult position because they need to
employ legal assistants, secretaries, investigators, and other nonlawyer
support staff in order to be more efficient, but they must be wary of
their employees leaving to work for another lawyer and disclosing
damaging, confidential information. On the opposing side, lawyers
involved especially in complex, prolonged litigation cannot risk hiring
new, experienced staff for fear a conflict may arise, forcing them to
withdraw or be disqualified. 6' Finally, lay personnel are torn because
of their desire for increased work responsibility and respect. But with
responsibility and respect come increased exposure to confidential in-
formation and, consequently, limits on employees' mobility.' 62 Lay
Similar ethics opinions have been issued by the state bars of Michigan, Mich. State Bar,
Formal Op. CI-1096 (1985) (disqualification automatic unless informed consent of all parties
received), and New Jersey, N.J. State Bar, Formal Op. 546 (1984) (presumption of shared
confidences irrebuttable).
159. See, e.g., Gregori v. Bank of Am., 207 Cal. App. 3d 291, 301-02, 254 Cal. Rptr.
853, 859 (1989) ("there is no provision of the Rules of Professional Conduct ... or statute
that explicitly proscribes [this] conduct") (emphasis in original).
160. Id. at 309, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 865 ("There is no doubt that [the attorney's] acts 'were
the essence of unprofessionalism and poor judgment.' However, it is one thing to say [the
attorney's] conduct was unprofessional and showed bad judgment and quite another to say,
as the trial court did not, that it warrants his disqualification.").
161. See Hall, supra note 136 (discussing trial court's order in Widger v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp.. For a discussion of Widger, see supra notes 136-143 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Albert, supra note 36, at 36, 37.
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personnel need to know about their ethical responsibilities so they can
relocate without risk to their new employers or to themselves.
This Note proposes that states adopt legislation that prohibits at-
torneys from hiring nonjawyer support staff from an adversary to work
on a matter substantially related to work performed for the adver-
sary.e6 If a law firm does employ a lay person with such a conflict
of interest, this Note proposes that the hiring firm must withdraw from
the representation or be disqualified, unless it can prove that the lay
person has not and will not use or disclose any confidential or priv-
ileged information.
Under the present system, attorneys are responsible for using rea-
sonable efforts to ensure that the conduct of their employees complies
with ethical rules and guidelines.'" The proposed rule simply would
add the requirement that attorneys use preventative measures to ensure
that no breaches of confidentiality occur. Such a requirement would
let lawyers and lay personnel alike know what is permitted and what
is not. It would decrease disqualification motions by providing a clear
rule to guide lawyers and nonlawyers in their conduct, thereby less-
ening the likelihood of allegations of ethical breach. The following
sections discuss the implications arising from such a rule and guide-
lines for its application.
A. Joint Responsibility
This Note proposes that both the hiring firm and the former firm
should have joint responsibility for protecting client information and
the integrity of the litigation. Only if both firms use preventative meas-
ures to dispel potential conflicts of interest will the clients be ade-
quately protected. The bulk of the responsibility, however, must lie
with the hiring firm.
Whenever an employee with prior legal experience joins a firm,
that firm should perform a conflict check, similar to that performed
163. The rule could be termed: "A lawyer or a law firm shall not employ a nonlawyer to
work on a client matter if:
(1) The nonlawyer previously worked for a lawyer or law firm that represented a
client in the same or a substantially related matter;
(2) The new lawyer's or law firm's client has interests materially adverse to the
former lawyer's or law firm's client; and
(3) The nonlawyer acquired confidential information about the former lawyer's or
law firm's client or the representation while employed at the former firm."
The legislation should take the form of a statute governing the legal professional because rules
of professional conduct serve as a basis of disciplinary action, not civil enforcement. Because
the author believes that Widger v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (In re Complex Asbestos
Litig.) was correctly decided, she would advocate adopting that rule either judicially or
legislatively.
164. MODE. RULEs OF PRoFESSIoNAL CONDUCT Rule 5.3 (1989); MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SiONAL RESPONSmBLTY DR 4-101(D) (1981); supra Part I.B.
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as part of the hiring of a new associate. The Model Rules provide that,
when hiring a new lawyer, a law firm should use "reasonable pro-
cedures" to detect whether any conflicts of interest might arise. 6 Be-
cause an employee may not always know the, names of all clients for
which she worked, "a firm's conflict checking system should include
the identity of adverse counsel to enable a search for those matters
where the prospective employee's former employer is or was ad-
verse. '" 66 The hiring firm then should ensure that the lay person is
not involved in any matter on which she performed substantial work,
or about which she gained confidential or privileged information, at
the former firm.
The former firm has an independent duty to protect the confi-
dences of its clients, and thus also must bear some of the responsi-
bility. Disciplinary Rule 4-101(D), for example, requires that lawyers
use reasonable efforts to prevent disclosure of confidential infor-
mation by an employee. 167 Furthermore, the Model Code's ethical con-
siderations note that a lawyer carefully must select and train her
employees "so that the sanctity of all confidences and secrets of [her]
clients may be preserved.' ' 68 Finally, the Model Rules require that
lawyers give reasonable supervision and training to their nonlawyer
employees regarding ethical conduct and "specifically the obligation
not to disclose information relating to representation of the client." 69
However, because a lawyer cannot control the conduct of an em-
ployee after the employee leaves the firm, the former employer cannot
be held responsible for disclosures subsequently made by that em-
ployee. Thus, if a lawyer learns that an employee with confidential
or privileged information is going to work for an opposing law firm,
the lawyer at that time should advise the hiring firm of the conflict
and request that screening procedures be implemented. 70 The re-
sponsibility then shifts to the hiring firm to guarantee that the new
employee does not use or divulge information regarding a client of
the former firm.
165. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment (1989).
166. Widger v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (In re Complex Asbestos Litig.), No.
A047921, slip op. at 27 n.10 (Cal. Ct. App. July 19, 1991) (citing 1 R. MALLEN & J. SMITH,
LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 13.18 (3d ed. 1989)).
167. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBrTY DR 4-101(D) (1981); see supra notes
26-27 and accompanying text.
168. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSBmLrrY EC 4-2 (1981); see also EC 4-5 ("a
lawyer should be diligent in his efforts to prevent the misuse of [information acquired in the
course of the representation of a client] by his employees and associates").
169. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.3 comment (1989).
170. See Fla. Bar Professional Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 5 (1986).
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B. Standards for Disqualification
This Note proposes a four-part test for analyzing a disqualifi-
cation motion. When an employee leaves a law firm and subsequently
works for another firm, creating a conflict, the court must disqualify
the hiring firm from any cases in which the following criteria are met:
(1) The employee was a "key employee" of the former employer; (2)
the work of the employee at the previous firm was the same or sub-
stantially related to the work at the hiring firm; (3) the employee re-
ceived client confidences or privileged information (attorney-client or
attorney work product) at her previous employment; and (4) the hiring
firm has failed to rebut the presumption of shared confidences.
(1) Key Employees
In attorney conflict of interest cases, the moving party first must
establish the existence of an attorney-client relationship in the former
representation.171 The same analysis should apply in the case of non-
lawyers. Although a lay person cannot "represent" a client or form
an attorney-client relationship, a lay person acting within the scope
of her employment is the lawyer's agent.172 As such, she owes a duty
to her employer's clients to hold inviolate their confidential infor-
mation.
Not all employees, however, can be treated the same. Although
this Note does not distinguish between secretaries, legal assistants, case
clerks, office managers, or other employees, it does distinguish em-
ployees in a position of trust from others. Before the proposed conflict
of interest rule will apply, the employee must have had access to com-
munications and writings that are confidential or protected by the at-
torney-client or the work product privileges.
The attorney-client privilege authorizes a client to refuse to dis-
close, and to prevent others from disclosing, confidential communi-
cations between the attorney and the client. 73 A client does not waive
the privilege simply by making the communication in the presence of
a third person, so long as that person is a representative of the client
or lawyer, or present to further the interest of the client.174 One court
has held that communications by an attorney to a client "in the pres-
171. Duncan v. Merrill, Lynch, 646 F.2d 1020, 1028 (5th Cir. 1981); Lawyers' Manual,
supra note 12, at 51:2007.
172. The presence of a nonlawyer employee during a client conference, for example, will
not destroy the attorney-client privilege. See infra notes 173-174 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 5.
174. See, e.g., CAL. Evro. CODE § 952 (West Supp. 1991); Nay. Rav. STAT. ANN. §§
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ence of, or disclosed to, clerks, secretaries, interpreters, physicians,
spouses, parents, business associates, or joint clients, when made to
further the interest of the client or when reasonably necessary for
transmission or accomplishment of the purpose of the consultation,
remain privileged.' ' 75 Thus, the client has a privilege to prevent non-
lawyers from disclosing confidential communications.
Moreover, the work product doctrine provides both an absolute
and a qualified privilege for an attorney's work in preparing for lit-
igation. 176 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state, "[D]ocuments
and tangible things. . . prepared in anticipation of litigation" are only
discoverable upon a showing of substantial need by the party seeking
discovery, and an attorney's thoughts, impressions, opinions, conclu-
sions or legal theories are not discoverable under any circumstances. 17 7
Courts have held that the work product privilege includes the mem-
oranda and notes of an attorney's employee. 78 Thus, if an employee
has created "work product" or has had access to the attorney's work
product, she should not be entitled to use that information later on
behalf of a new firm engaged in litigation against the former firm's
client.
Therefore, the first question the court must ask is: Did the em-
ployee have access to confidential or privileged information while em-
ployed at the former firm? If so, then a potential conflict of interest
exists. If not, then neither the employee nor the hiring firm is pro-
hibited from working on the litigation. As one court noted, it is ir-
relevant that an employee makes no "lawyerlike decisions" so long
as she has access to confidential information to which lawyers also
have access. 79
(2) Substantial Relationship
As with attorney conflict of interest rules, for a nonlawyer con-
flict of interest to arise, a substantial relationship must exist between
the representation at the previous firm and the representation at the
49.065-49.095 (Michie 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-6(B) (1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 2502 (West 1980); OR. REv. STAT. § 40.225 (1988); S.D. CODnEMD LAws § 19-13-2 (1987);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.03 (West 1975).
175. Insurance Co. of North Am. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 3d 758, 771, 166 Cal.
Rptr. 880, 888 (1980).
176. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3). See also supra note 9.
177. FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(b)(3).
178. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of North Am., 108 Cal. App. 3d at 771, 166 Cal. Rptr. at
888.
179. Esquire Care, Inc. v. Maguire, 532 So. 2d 740, 741 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
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new firm. This does not mean that the employee must work on iden-
tical litigation; the substantial relationship test is met if the infor-
mation acquired by the employee at the first firm could disadvantage
the client if disclosed to the hiring firm. As the court in Kapco Man-
ufacturing Co. v. C & 0 Enterprises, Inc.180 stated, the substantial
relationship test is satisfied if a "substantial nexus exists between the
subject matter of the 'prior and present' relationship of the [employee]
and her former and current places of employment."' 81 States should
adopt the "substantial nexus" approach, asserted by the Kapco court,
in support staff conflict of interest analysis.
Courts should require a substantial relationship to exist for two
reasons. First, a support staff conflict of interest rule based on the
substantial nexus test would not be overbroad. Courts have voiced
concern that applying conflict of interest rules to nonlawyers would
restrict the mobility of lay personnel and create an insurmountable
burden on hiring firms to clear conflicts. 8 2 Two measures would help
allay such fears: restricting the rule to "key employees," and applying
the rule only to situations in which a "substantial nexus" exists be-
tween representations. These conditions will restrict application of the
rule to circumstances in which the employee received information at
the prior firm, disclosure of which could disadvantage the prior firm's
client. Second, a rule predicated on the substantial nexus test would
not be underinclusive. Clients should not have to prove that the em-
ployee is working on the identical matter for the opponent. However,
an employee may learn confidential information about a client from
one matter that could be used against that client in a different, but
related, matter. It therefore is essential that a substantial relationship
test be included in the rule proposed by this Note.
(3) Actual Receipt of Confidential or Privileged Information
In attorney conflict of interest cases, once the former client es-
tablishes the requisite substantial relationship, the court presumes that
the attorney acquired confidential information from her firm's former
client. 83 If applied to nonlawyers, this presumption may result in un-
180. 637 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Il1 1985).
181. Id. at 1237 n.13; see supra notes 125-128 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., Kapco, 637 F. Supp. at 1235; Herron v. Jones, 276 Ark. 493, 497, 637
S.W.2d 569, 571 (1982); Widger v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. (In re Complex Asbestos
Litig.) No. A047921, slip op. at 13, 29-30 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 19, 1991); Hall, supra note
136, at 9, col. 1; ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1526,
at 3 (1988).
183. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
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due hardship. Nonlawyers often are exposed only to confidential in-
formation about the matters on which they worked, whereas lawyers
are presumed to have access to confidential information about all the
firm's clients. This is especially true when the employee comes from
a large firm because she may have had no involvement with the case
posing the conflict.
A more equitable approach would be to require the moving party
to prove that the nonlawyer employee actually had access to confi-
dential information. This burden of prQof is not insurmountable. The
former employer can testify to what the employee's responsibilities
were in the office and for which clients the employee worked. And
the moving party only need prove that the employee attended client
meetings, drafted correspondence or pleadings, performed legal re-
search, assisted in trial preparation, or had any other access to con-
fidential or privileged information while working for the former
employer.
Although this may appear an easy burden to meet, it should not
require proof of which confidences the employee actually received.
Courts should be mindful of attorney conflict of interest decisions
voicing concern over requiring disclosure of the very information the
rule is intended to protect.' u It is enough for the moving party to prove
that the type of work the employee performed exposed her to con-
fidential information.
(4) Presumption of Shared Confidences
Once the moving party proves that the nonlawyer employee was
exposed to confidential or privileged information at her prior firm,
the burden shifts to the opposing party to rebut the presumption of
shared confidences. The moving party should not be required to prove
that the hiring firm's policies are inadequate; it is the hiring firm that
should have the burden of proving what precautions, if any, it has
taken to avoid a conflict of interest. If, however, the nonlawyer has
worked on a substantially related matter or has discussed the matter
with another member of the firm, the damage has occurred and dis-
qualification should follow.
Screening is the most effective way to rebut this presumption.'85
The employee should not work on the matter; she should not be ex-
posed to any of the work or files; and she should be admonished not
184. See, e.g., Woods v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 931, 934, 197 Cal. Rptr. 185,
187 (1983); see also supra text accompanying note 76.
185. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
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to discuss the case with anyone in the office, including other non-
lawyers. Such an ethical wall might not be sufficient to protect con-
fidential information in a small law firm with only a few nonlawyer
employees, but it should be effective in a larger firm with more staff
available to work on conflicting representations. When determining
whether a screening mechanism is sufficient to rebut the presumption
of shared confidences, a court should examine a variety of factors: 18 6
(1) The screening must take place immediately; once any information
is divulged, the firm should be disqualified;
(2) The files involved in the conflict should be either physically seg-
regated or marked so that they are easily identifiable at a distance;
(3) The employee should not discuss the lawsuit with any of the law-
yers or any of the lay personnel in the hiring firm;
(4) The hiring firm should send a memo to all its lawyers and lay
personnel who are involved in the litigation, instructing them not to
discuss the case with the employee; and
(5) The hiring firm should inform the former employer of the sit-
uation and of the steps it has taken to avoid a conflict of interest.
If the hiring firm takes these steps, it should be able to continue
its representation without any risk of disqualification. If, however, the
hiring firm does not effectively screen the nonlawyer employee, or if
a breach of confidentiality nevertheless occurs, the law firm may have
to withdraw from representation or risk disqualification. 18
Conclusion
When a nonlawyer employee moves from one law firm to another
law firm that represents adverse interests, a potential conflict of in-
terest arises. The hiring law firm should not be permitted to gain an
unfair advantage in the matter by putting the employee to work on
the opposite side of the case. Currently, the law is unclear as to whether
the hiring firm should be disqualified or allowed to continue its rep-
resentation.
Conflict of interest rules serve many purposes. They allow clients
to discuss matters freely with their lawyers, secure in the knowledge
that the information they reveal will remain private. They reaffirm the
186. For examples of the factors courts have used to determine whether an ethical wall is
effective, see Nemours Found. v. Gilbane, 632 F. Supp. 418, 421 (D. Del. 1986); Kovacevic
v. Fair Automotive Repair, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 237, 244 (N.D. In. 1986); Moser, supra note
85, at 410; Orlik, The Chinese Wall: Fact or Fiction, LEGAL AssIs5TAT TODAY, Sept.-Oct.
1988, at 47, 48.
187. Moser, supra note 85, at 411.
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duty of loyalty that lawyers owe to clients. They allow lawyers to de-
velop and record trial tactics and strategies without fear that their work
product will be divulged. They help ensure that neither party obtains
an unfair advantage in the litigation. And they uphold the integrity
of the judicial process.
On the other hand, disqualification motions can delay litigation,
deny a party the right to her counsel of choice, or injure a law firm's
reputation. 8 8 In addition, both courts and ethics committees have ex-
pressed concern that nonlawyers should not be unduly restricted from
changing their employment.'8 9 Conflict of interest rules must strike a
balance between these competing concerns.
The fairness and integrity of the judicial process can best be pro-
tected by adopting a conflict of interest rule, similar to that currently
in force for attorneys, for cases involving nonlawyers who go to work
for adversaries. Adoption of such a rule would provide certainty and
clarity, by giving lawyers and their employees more comprehensive
guidelines for ethical conduct. States must recognize that nonlawyers
often are privy to as much confidential information as their employers
and provide appropriate protections. The adoption of a rule like the
one delineated in this Note would be a step in the right direction.
188. Id. at 404; see also supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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